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 Preface 
 
Europe is a continent of cities with a remarkable history of cultural inspiration, wealth creation, social and politi-
cal dynamism. But in the late-20th century, many former industrial cities entered a period of steep decline, los-
ing most of their manufacturing jobs and many of their economic functions. Populations declined and wealthier 
suburbs outstripped the declining inner cities that had housed the ‘engines of the world’ and now housed some 
of the greatest concentrations of poverty. The US experienced even more extreme decline. 
 
The idea of Weak Market Cities was born at the second UK Government conference on an Urban Renais-
sance, hosted by Manchester in 2002. European and American city leaders debated the changing fortunes and 
prospects of former industrial cities. The pressures of growth and sprawl were counterbalanced with inner ur-
ban depopulation and decay; the new skills needed for the new ‘knowledge’ and ‘service’ economy were con-
trasted with high levels of worklessness and poor schools. Cities now house the majority and fastest growing 
share of the world’s expanding population, and they are on a treadmill of physical pressure, social disorder, and 
economic insecurity. 
 
The London School of Economics’ Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) with the Brookings Metro-
politan Institute developed a programme to uncover the problems besetting such cities, the recovery measures 
under way and their impact. Generously funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, CASE researchers identi-
fied seven cities across Europe, embarking on impressive recovery actions to reverse decline. We wanted to 
establish the common ground and differences between a group of comparable cities, exploring their progress 
and ongoing challenges. Seven cities in five countries became partners in our work: Bremen, Saint-Étienne, 
Leipzig, Torino, Bilbao, Sheffield and Belfast. The five countries – Germany, Italy, France, Spain and the UK – 
represent nearly two thirds of the EU’s population. 
 
All the cities had four common characteristics: a major industrial and manufacturing history; severe loss of 
these industries and related jobs; population outflow; a crisis of leadership, economic viability and inward in-
vestment. We rooted our study in the actual experience of cities, based on visits, interviews, historical and cur-
rent local reports. In documenting what we found, we looked for patterns of change and common lessons that 
might be more widely applicable. 
 
We recognised that the wealth of detailed experience, lived out by local residents, actors and organisations in 
each particular place, should be captured in some way. Therefore we are pleased to present reports from each 
of the cities as working papers, documenting what we have found so far and inviting further evidence, comment 
and debate. The story is both dramatic and encouraging everywhere. But it is also full of uncertainty and only 
tenuous conclusions are possible. It would be premature to forecast the future trajectory of any of the seven 
cities. 
 
The seven city reports in this series are seen by us and our city reformer colleagues as work in progress. We 
hope that students, practitioners, urban researchers and policy makers will find them useful as case studies 
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 and will feed in ideas, reactions and any corrections to the research team. We plan to present a clear overview 
of how cities facing such acute problems are faring in 2008. 
 
I warmly thank our researchers, Jörg Plöger and Astrid Winkler, for the sheer scale of the undertaking and the 
immensely detailed work involved in collecting ground-level evidence in the languages of the country and writ-
ing up the reports. Sharing their learning through the reports will help many to appreciate the spirited comeback 
of cities. For as the Mayor of Saint-Étienne argues: ‘Very often the soul of the city is stronger than the industrial 
disasters, which drag it down, make it wobble and threaten to wipe it out.’ (Michel Thiollière, 2007) 
 
Anne Power 
CASE 
26th October, 2007 
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 1. CITY CONTEXT 
 
 
Leipzig is located in the federal state of Saxony (in German: Sachsen) in East Germany. The city is located 
some 150 kilometres south-west of Germany’s capital, Berlin, and some 300 kilometres north-east of Frankfurt 
(Figs. 1 and 2). The region shares direct borders with the Czech Republic and Poland. With its 4.3 million 
inhabitants, Saxony is the most populous of the new Länder formed after the German reunification. Although 
slightly more prosperous than the other East German regions, it still lags behind the West German average on 
most indicators. 
 
Fig. 1: Germany Fig. 2: Federal German state of Saxony 
   
Source: Spiegel (online) Source: European Commission (online) 
 
Saxony’s urban hierarchy is dominated by three cities of similar size: Dresden; Leipzig; and Chemnitz. These 
cities have traditionally been characterised by their different functions. While Dresden with its historic grandeur 
is the regional administrative capital, busy Leipzig is the commercial and trade centre and Chemnitz (named 
Karl-Marx-Stadt during the GDR period) is the major industrial city. A popular saying has summarised this 
division as ‘produced in Chemnitz, sold in Leipzig, spent in Dresden’. Leipzig has around 500,000 inhabitants. 
Although it has dropped to thirteenth place among Germany’s larger cities, it is still the second largest city in 
East Germany after Berlin. 
 
Leipzig originates from a Slavic village founded around 900AD. Town status was accorded in 1165. Benefiting 
from a favourable location at the crossroads of central and Eastern European trading routes, it developed into a 
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 major market centre in the late middle ages. The trade fair which earned Leipzig the title Messestadt (Trade 
Fair City) is the oldest in Europe. Leipzig also developed a significant cultural role and is home to Germany’s 
second oldest university (1409). Box 1 shows the historic evolution of the city. 
 
Box 1: Leipzig: Timetable of important events until 1990 
~ 900 Emergence of a Slavic village 
1165 Town status conferred 
1409 University founded 
1497 Leipzig receives privilege for trade fair 
1813 Battle of the Nations near Leipzig led to decisive defeat for Napoleonic troops 
1838 First German long-distance train connection between Leipzig and Dresden 
1871-1914 Gründerzeit era: industrialisation, rapid urban growth and increasing functional importance 
1913 Completion of Europe’s largest terminal train station 
1933 Population peak 
1949-1989 Existence of two post-war German states, in opposing power blocs during the Cold War 
1989 ‘Monday demonstrations’ triggering ‘peaceful revolution’ that led to collapse of socialist regime 
1990 German reunification; Currency Union 
 
In Germany, most cities experienced their most dramatic process of urban transformation as a consequence of 
rapid industrialisation during the so-called Gründerzeit (foundation period). This period begins with the victory 
against France in 1871 and the subsequent creation and consolidation of the German nation-state and ends 
with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Most of the older housing stock in German cities was constructed 
during this period, in typically dense four-to-five storey apartment buildings. Leipzig underwent a process of 
rapid industrialisation during the second half of the 19th century. It was mainly driven by the publishing, textile 
and metalworking industries. Its emergence as a major urban centre is also mirrored in the unprecedented 
population growth (Fig. 3). In the last three decades of the 19th century, the city’s population more than 
quadrupled – from 107,000 (1871) to 456,000 (1900). 
 
Fig. 3: Leipzig: Population development (1850-1989) 
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Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen; Stadt Leipzig (2006); Nuissl and Rink (2003). 
Note: time axis not calibrated 
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 After Germany’s unification in 1871, the former kingdom of Saxony became an independent region. Leipzig 
emerged as a leading German city. This was reflected in a number of civic buildings and functions: the 
Supreme Court of the newly founded German Empire (1879); the Gewandhaus concert hall (1898), the New 
Town Hall (1905, Fig. 4); the National Library (1912); and one of Europe’s largest train stations (1913, Fig. 25). 
 
Fig. 4: Symbolising the growing city: New Town Hall, on the edge of the historic city centre 
 
All pictures by the author unless stated otherwise 
 
During the inter-war period (1918-1939), Leipzig continued to grow, reaching its population peak in the 1930s 
with almost 750,000 inhabitants. At this point, Leipzig was the fourth largest German city. Population growth 
during this period was fuelled mainly by further industrialisation with the electrical, chemical, mining and energy 
sectors being added to the existing industrial base. 
 
Leipzig was less damaged during World War II than other major German cities, such as its Saxon counterpart, 
Dresden, and its urban structure remained virtually intact. The division of Germany into two states in 1949 
meant however a significant political, social and economic rupture. For the urban development of East German 
cities this resulted in a dramatic change of path. During the regime of the socialist German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), most power functions were concentrated in East Berlin and regional governments were 
dissolved. From this point on, Leipzig experienced a gradual decline in significance. 
 
The GDR’s orientation towards the Eastern Bloc disrupted Leipzig’s traditional commercial ties. Many of the 
surviving industrial plants were dismantled by Soviet troops as war compensation. But industrial activity was 
soon revived by the creation of large industrial conglomerates (Kombinate) based on the previous industrial 
sectors (Fig. 5). By continuing to host the annual international trade fair, which functioned as the showpiece of 
the Eastern Bloc’s industrial production, Leipzig managed to retain one of the few remaining links with the West 
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 (Fig. 6). Thus the city continued to benefit from its traditional role as a hub for commerce and trade. Leipzig 
also remained an important centre of cultural life in the GDR. Population figures however reflect its relative loss 
of importance. Leipzig was the only major East German city to experience considerable population losses 
before 1990. As Figure 3 shows, the population declined from 713,000 in 1933 to 530,000 in 1989. 
 
Fig. 5: Heavy machinery for open-cast mining produced by Kombinat Takraf, Leipzig 
 
Source: http://lexikon.freenet.de/images/de/0/01/Bucket_wheel_excavator_in_Ferropolis.jpg 
 
Fig. 6: Impressions from Leipzig’s trade fair during the GDR period 
 
Source: http://shop.alte-ansichtskarten.com 
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 Political change accelerated when Glasnost politics were implemented under Michail Gorbatschow in the 
former Soviet Union. Towards the end of the 1980s, the former Eastern Bloc quickly disintegrated following the 
collapse of one socialist regime after the other. The citizens of Leipzig played an important part in East 
Germany’s political transformation. In the autumn of 1989 the weekly ‘Monday demonstrations’ started on the 
square in front of the Nikolai church (Fig. 7). This ‘peaceful revolution’ brought about the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the end of the GDR regime in November that same year. East Germany was run by a transitional 
government until 3rd October 1990, when the two German states were reunified. In practice, reunification meant 
that East Germany was absorbed into the existing West German political and economic framework. The federal 
structure was extended to East Germany where five new Länder were created in 1991. 
 
Fig. 7: ‘Monday demonstrations’ in Leipzig 
 
Source: http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumgallery/372/_wir_sind_das_volk.html 
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 2. CRISIS 
 
 
It immediately became obvious that East Germany had fallen behind West Germany whilst the country was split 
in two. For Leipzig this meant being relegated from the first to the second or even third tier of German cities in 
terms of its significance as a demographic, economic and cultural centre. The city had experienced slow but 
continuous decline throughout the socialist era, although this was partially hidden by a lack of transparency. 
The opening up of the transformation period caused a much more visible and rapid decline in the years 
immediately following reunification in 1990. Integration into West Germany – adoption of its constitution, 
political and legal systems and the difficult process of adapting to a new economic model – was a shock. 
Leipzig and other cities in the new Länder and other transitional economies, soon displayed particular patterns 
of urban decline which came to be labelled ‘shrinking cities’ (Oswalt, 2005). The most obvious signs of crisis 
were: 
• Industrial collapse 
• Environmental damage 
• Increasing social problems, especially unemployment 
• Population decline 
• Uncontrolled suburbanisation and sprawl on the urban periphery 
• Housing crisis, signified by decay and high vacancy rates 
• Overburdened public administration 
 
Each of these problems is described briefly below. 
 
Industrial Collapse 
The industrial collapse of East Germany was profound and quick. Only in the three years from 1990 to 1993 
more than half of the 4 million industrial jobs were lost (Heinker, 2004:151). There were several reasons for this 
accelerated process of deindustrialisation. First, East German industry had been protected from free-market 
international competition and so in most cases was not fit to deal with the new conditions. Second, most 
companies were not prepared for the new economic conditions attached to the early currency reform in 1990, 
which replaced the East German Mark with the West German Deutsche Mark. Most companies had inadequate 
access to the new money and were unable to pay their employees, meet production costs or invest in much-
needed modern technology. In addition, the Treuhandanstalt, the agency set up to handle the privatisation of 
the state-owned East German industrial conglomerates, was in many cases unable to ensure their survival (F. 
Hahn, interview). The Treuhandanstalt was widely criticised for selling-off supposedly non-competitive East 
German companies and their assets too quickly to West German and international investors without overseeing 
any adaptation process (M. Schimansky, interview). In Leipzig, out of the 800 privatised companies, almost 300 
were closed (Heinker, 2004:161). A typical example is the case of the largest industrial conglomerate Takraf, 
producing heavy machinery (Fig. 5), which was divided into different segments, which were then either closed 
or sold to investors. Its workforce original workforce of 5,000 was quickly reduced to just 250. 
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 Leipzig’s industrial sector was held to be somewhat less innovative than elsewhere. Even among East German 
cities, which suffered greatly, the process of deindustrialisation in Leipzig was particularly severe. Figure 8 
shows the loss of industrial employment in the city. In only seven years – from 1989 to 1996 – 90,000 
manufacturing jobs were lost, a decline of 90 per cent (O. Weigel, presentation at CRG meeting, March 2006). 
None of our other case study cities experienced a similar scale of industrial decline. In 1991, 27 per cent of the 
workforce was still employed in manufacturing, but the proportion fell to 11 per cent by 2004 (IHK Leipzig, 
2006). Although the service sector expanded it could not compensate for these dramatic losses. Leipzig’s 
difficulties were compounded by the fact that, unlike Chemnitz, it was not regarded as a typical industrial city 
and therefore saving manufacturing jobs was not high on the agenda (M. Schimansky, interview). 
 
Fig. 8: Leipzig: Number of employees in manufacturing (1989-1996) 
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Source: Stadt Leipzig (2006) 
 
Environmental damage 
Leipzig is located close to the industrial heart of the former GDR. The concentration of heavy industries within 
the region, in cities such as Bitterfeld and Leuna, has caused serious pollution of air, water and soil. In Leipzig 
itself and in its surroundings, industrial elements such as the carbo-chemical industry, coal-fired power plants 
and open-cast lignite mining generated a massive environmental burden by the end of the 1980s (Fig. 9). 
Mining was responsible for damage to large areas to the south of the city. No significant environmental or green 
movement existed in East Germany during the GDR regime. Although the sudden collapse of the industrial 
sector following the economic restructuring described above had serious social consequences (see below), it 
had a direct positive impact on environmental conditions and aspects of quality of life 
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 Fig. 9: Heavy industry, early 1990s 
 
Source: UFZ Leipzig 
 
Increasing social problems 
The rapid economic and political restructuring resulted in substantial social problems across East Germany. 
The loss of industrial employment was by far not compensated for by new jobs created in the expanding 
service sector. In Leipzig, as elsewhere, unemployment became the most serious social problem. Although 
officially non-existent, some hidden unemployment had already occurred under the socialist system. Due to 
rapid job losses in the years after reunification, the unemployment increased steadily, reaching almost 20 per 
cent by the late 1990s. It must be noted however that many workers affected by the early closures were often 
given generous social packages and early-retirement schemes. Leipzig’s unemployment rate was substantially 
higher than the figures for Germany as a whole and, in 2005, even surpassed the high levels for East Germany 
(Fig. 10).  
 
Fig. 10: Unemployment rates for Leipzig and Germany, in % (1990-2005) 
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Sources: Stat. Bundesamt; Stat. Landesamt Sachsen; Bertelsmann Stiftung. (all online) 
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 Rising unemployment led to a number of further problems. The labour market became increasingly difficult to 
access both for older workers who had lost their jobs as well as the younger generation that was about to enter 
it. The proportion of long-term unemployed increased steadily. The malfunction of the labour market had a 
detrimental effect on the public budget, forcing the government to spend an increasing amount on social 
welfare. Meanwhile, the creation of some high-skilled service sector jobs caused greater socio-economic 
inequalities, a social condition practically non-existent in the previous socialist context. The introduction of new 
social values and consumption-oriented lifestyles on the one hand and high levels of social welfare dependency 
on the other often caused psychological stress and frustration. 
 
Population decline 
Population decline accelerated after the profound transformation process initiated by German reunification. In 
the decade following reunification, Leipzig lost almost 100,000 inhabitants or 20 per cent of its population, 
reaching an historic low of 437,000 in 1998 (Fig. 11). Three parallel demographic processes caused the decline 
(S. Heinig, interview): 
• Suburbanisation was the most important factor, responsible for approximately half of the losses, and 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
• Migration towards more prosperous and dynamic West German regions was responsible for about a 
quarter of the decline. This process meant also a brain drain, as it was predominantly skilled, 
economically active people aged between 20 and 40 who left. Only in the first two years after the 
collapse of the GDR, 32,000 people left Leipzig for West Germany. 
• Lower birth rates reduced the population by approximately another quarter as the birth rate in East 
Germany dropped below the already low West German levels following reunification. 
 
Fig. 11: Leipzig: Population development (1989-1998) 
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Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen; Stadt Leipzig. (both online) 
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 Suburbanisation and sprawl 
Due to strict regulations on settlement pattern, East German cities had practically no suburban hinterland until 
1990. Since reunification, the mostly rural municipalities surrounding Leipzig were heavily transformed by 
residential and commercial suburbanisation. In the early period this process has been called ‘Wild East 
suburbanisation’ (Nuissl and Rink, 2003). The developments were driven by market forces and often 
characterised by their lack of planning and sustainability. Figure 12 illustrates a typical housing development of 
this period. Suburbanisation already reached its peak between 1995 and 1998 (ibid.). 
 
Fig. 12: Suburban developments of the mid-1990s 
 
 
The emerging urban sprawl was the result of a number of push- and pull-factors (Nuissl and Rink, 2005): 
• Catching-up: Due to restrictions on owner-occupied housing under the GDR, East German cities had 
almost no low-density suburban single-family housing at the time of reunification. Although socialist 
housing policy triggered a displacement of the population into larger estates on the urban fringe, this 
did not spill over into adjacent jurisdictions. Suburbanisation can be regarded as a process of catching-
up with Western patterns. The expectation of rapid adjustment to Western standards and easy access 
to federal subsidies also fostered speculative suburban developments. 
• Lack of land-use regulation: Immediately after reunification, Eastern local authorities were not ready 
to regulate land-use according to the newly-introduced Western planning system. With instruments and 
laws not yet fully applied, investors from the West took advantage by building suburban developments 
which would not have met planning standards under the federal system. Although general planning 
guidelines are proposed at the federal and regional level, the power over planning lies with municipal 
governments in Germany. 
• Inappropriate federal policy: Like post-war policies in the US, several federal policies and fiscal 
instruments actually intensified the suburbanisation trend. These include: private ownership housing 
allowances (Eigenheimzulage), introduced to increase home ownership and to overcome perceived 
housing shortages; transport subsidies in the form of a mileage allowance for car commuters 
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 (Pendlerpauschale); tax write-off models for run-down older housing stock (Sonderabschreibungen); 
and massive investments in East German road development, along with other infrastructure. 
• Legal obstacles to inner city renewal: In order to re-establish the pre-war ownership of properties 
expropriated during the socialist regime, the guiding principle was to favour restitution of properties to 
their previous owners rather than compensation payments (Rückgabe vor Entschädigung). In Leipzig, 
some 30,000 restitution claims had to be decided upon. As a result, there was initially little incentive to 
invest in the decaying and disputed inner-city housing stock. This significantly delayed urban renewal 
and exacerbated decay and abandonment of the existing stock. 
 
The resulting sprawl caused new problems such as unnecessarily extending the city onto land that had not 
previously been urbanised, increasing the environmental burden on the city and its surroundings. In Leipzig, the 
new suburban developments were not accompanied by investments in the public transport infrastructure, 
making the new housing dependent on the use of private cars. Suburbanisation also had a negative financial 
effect on the core city. The demographic shift towards the suburbs involved mostly middle-class households 
and therefore caused a reduction in the tax base. Another problem for the core city is the undermining of its 
central city functions through retail competition from new shopping malls on the periphery. 
 
Housing crisis 
A specific feature of the urban crisis in East German cities is the housing crisis characterised by a housing 
stock in urgent need of renovation and high vacancy rates. Due to this situation, almost 30,000 housing units 
were already vacant in 1989 (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). The vacancy rate rose sharply during the 1990s. The peak 
was reached in 2000, with approximately 62,500 vacant housing units, or 20 per cent of the existing stock (Fig. 
13). In Leipzig, housing problems were usually concentrated in the pre-1918 segment of the housing stock and 
from the mid-1990s also in the large socialist estates of the post-war period. Due to its large share of the overall 
housing stock however, almost 60 per cent of the population were still occupying pre-1918 housing units in the 
1990s (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). Slightly over 30 per cent of inhabitants lived in the socialist housing estates, half of 
whom or 75,000 in Grünau, East Germany’s second largest Plattenbau estate (Fig. 15). 
 
As Leipzig was bombed less than other cities during World War II, it still has a relatively large pre-1918 housing 
stock from the Gründerzeit period. During the socialist era the main emphasis of the GDR housing policy was 
on the construction of mass-built estates1, often located on the periphery of the cities. These estates were built 
on a huge scale from the early 1970s. The population usually favoured them over the derelict older stock 
because of higher housing standards. The older inner-city housing stock, on the other hand, was largely 
neglected. Only limited efforts were put into its renovation. Therefore most of it was in a very bad physical 
condition by 1990 (Fig. 14). According to estimates, three quarters of the 258,000 housing units required 
renovation in 1990 (Stadt Leipzig, 2005). While 13 per cent of the housing stock was in a very bad condition, 9 
per cent were labelled as uninhabitable. 58 per cent of the housing still used coal stoves for heating and 19 per 
cent did not have a proper bath. 
                                                     
1  In East Germany these estates are usually called Plattenbau because of their characteristic construction technique using prefabri-
cated units (concrete slabs). 
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 Fig. 13: Share of vacant housing stock in Leipzig (2000-2005) 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
2000 2002 2005
post-1990
1949-1990
1918-1948
pre-1918
 
Source: Stadt Leipzig (2006). 
 
Fig. 14: Housing problem I: Fig. 15: Housing problem II: 
Decaying pre-1918 housing stock (East Leipzig) mass-built estates on the periphery (Grünau) 
     
 
Overburdened public administration 
Along with these problems, as elsewhere in Germany, the public administration of the City of Leipzig had more 
and more difficulty maintaining a balanced budget. While the local tax base fell due to the reduced population 
and closure of companies, the city struggled to meet the demand for public services. A characteristic problem 
of ‘shrinking cities’ is that they are equipped with an obsolete and oversized public infrastructure (technical and 
transport), which requires maintenance while being used by fewer people. The increasing numbers of 
households dependent on social welfare put pressure on strained urban budgets. The problematic situation in 
the housing sector described above also demanded urgent action. Yet, because of fiscal pressures, the Leipzig 
administration had only limited flexibility to confront its problems and design long-term regeneration policies. 
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 3. RECOVERY: ACTIONS TAKEN 
 
 
3.1 Strategy change: from pro-growth to adjustment 
At the beginning of the transformation period resulting from German reunification2, the German economy was 
expanding. Alongside the positive political mood in Germany, there was strong belief that East Germany would 
quickly catch up with West German standards. For this reason, pro-growth strategies were adopted throughout 
East Germany in the 1990s. East Germans had great expectations that living conditions would rapidly improve. 
This was particularly true in Leipzig where the population had played such a decisive role in the transformation 
and where surveys gave evidence of the widespread feeling of elation and confidence. Leipzig became known 
as a ‘boom town’, mainly due to the manifold construction activities (Heinker, 2004). 
 
But it was soon realised that the ‘blossoming landscapes’ which Chancellor Kohl had promised for East 
Germany in 1990 would not materialise quickly. It became increasingly obvious that the pro-growth strategies 
adopted by the German government were far too optimistic and generally failed all over East Germany. The 
weak economic base, population losses, rising unemployment and collapsing public services became too 
serious to ignore. It was also more and more recognised that almost all cities were actually shrinking rather 
than growing. 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, driven by strong city leadership, Leipzig was the first major East German city to 
recognise the need to adopt more realistic approaches to urban development and to develop a strategy that 
would target its specific problems and challenges. The actions advocated in this new approach can be 
summarised under two broader headings: 
• ‘Fix the problems’: There was a need to identify the problems and develop a strategy to fix them. This 
strand was mostly aimed at strengthening the inner-city to increase its attractiveness and enable it to 
compete with the suburbs, both in residential and commercial uses. The actions under this strand had 
a strong urban renewal focus. 
• ‘Think big’: In contrast to the more responsive first strand of fixing problems, this second strand of the 
recovery strategy aimed to position Leipzig firmly as a recognised and established economic and cul-
tural centre in the emerging European city network. This included major efforts to attract large compa-
nies to the city on the one hand and the promotion of large-scale events and developments on the 
other hand. 
                                                     
2  In Germany, this period is usually called Wende, which refers to the abrupt change of path for East Germany. 
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 3.2 Urban Renewal 
The particular problems of becoming a ‘shrinking city’ put housing high on the political agenda. With rising 
vacancy rates in inner-city neighbourhoods, the housing market had become increasingly dysfunctional. Urban 
renewal was seen as essential in the fight against population loss. Competing with the attractive job markets in 
West German cities was difficult. Nonetheless, it was argued that the city could compete with its own suburbia 
by fostering a supply of attractive inner-city housing and other urban amenities. Here, the structure of the 
existing housing stock proved favourable as Leipzig has a relatively large stock of decayed but potentially 
attractive pre-1918 buildings. In order to recreate a functioning housing market with incentives for owners to 
invest in their properties, it was thought necessary to target urban renewal carefully by demolishing the most 
extreme areas of abandonment. By concentrating limited resources strategically, the city gradually re-marketed 
the inner-city as an attractive place to live. 
 
Debates about the urban future (since 1998) 
From 1998, the City Council convened several Stadtwerkstatt, an occasional urban roundtable, to bring 
together important urban thinkers and actors to discuss specific problems. Some of these roundtables have 
been relevant for the formulation of urban strategies in Leipzig (M. Döhler-Behzadi, interview). One landmark 
was the 1998 workshop where urban experts discussed the future of the ‘last third’ of the housing stock, which 
had not yet been renovated (Fig. 16). This meeting was informed by dominant themes such as demographic 
decline and the lack of public resources. The resulting position paper enunciated three major principles on how 
to deal with the situation (S. Gabi, interview): 
• to enhance the attractions of the inner-city, in order to compete with suburban developments; 
• to accept that insufficient public funds made investment in all areas impossible; and 
• to enhance the necessity for some demolition. Limited demolition of the least attractive segments of the 
existing housing stock would have a positive effect on the urban environment, such as lower densities, 
more individual housing options, more green areas and more public spaces). 
 
Fig. 16: Characteristic patchwork of renovated and derelict buildings in Leipzig’s inner 
neighbourhoods:  
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 Strategic Urban Development Plan (2000) 
In 2000, the city published an Urban Development Plan that specifically targeted housing and urban renewal. It 
defined a joint strategy for the older housing stock, the large estates and new construction. The main aims were 
to increase the competitiveness of well-equipped inner-city neighbourhoods and to consolidate the housing 
market. In order to achieve these aims, the city decided to support the renewal of selected areas as well as 
aiming to demolish between 15,000 and 20,000 properties by 2010 (Stadt Leipzig, 2002). 
 
This process was accompanied by the planning department’s development of a micro-level urban monitoring 
system. This was used to understand and evaluate urban development trends and to help decision-making and 
in designing future policies. Leipzig was one of the first East German cities to use such a tool. It was based on 
a similar tool used in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia and was supported by federal research funds (S. 
Heinig, interview). 
 
Given the restricted resources, it was decided to allocate the available funds in three large areas of the city that 
were identified as particularly needy (O. Weigel, interview): The two areas of East and West Leipzig are 
dominated by pre-1918 housing and Grünau is dominated by large-scale socialist housing. While the older 
neighbourhoods were already characterised by several problems such as physical decay, lack of renovation 
and high vacancy rates, the large estate increasingly began to show signs of decline from the second half of 
the 1990s.  
 
In addition to its own activities, the City was able to draw on several external funding streams. Several 
interviewees mentioned the particular success of the Department of Urban Renewal and Housing in accessing 
these external funds. From 1997 to 2003 on average 30 to 40 million Euros from local, regional, federal and EU 
governments were available (Stadt Leipzig, 2006).3 Following the principles set out in the strategic Urban 
Development Plan, these funds were then allocated to the identified areas. East Leipzig, which showed the 
highest levels of deprivation, was assisted through funds from the Soziale Stadt neighbourhood renewal 
programme, funded equally by the federal and regional governments.4 EU Regional funding (Objective 1) was 
also used. In West Leipzig a considerable part of the funding for urban renewal came from the EU URBAN II 
programme. This area, counting a population of 31,000, received 20 million Euros between 2000 and 2006 
(URBAN documentation). Figure 17 shows the current  
 
Housing Vacancy Commission and demolition programme Stadtumbau Ost 
As a result of the increasing problems with housing vacancies in East Germany, an interdisciplinary expert 
commission bringing together leading urban experts and thinkers was formed in 2000. The fact that Leipzig’s 
former mayor Lehmann-Grube chaired the commission can be taken as a sign that early recognition of the 
problems of ‘shrinking’ gave Leipzig a head-start over other cities, and a leading role in expressing the specific 
needs of East Germany. Officially called the ‘Expert Commission on the Restructuring of the Housing Market in 
East Germany’, it also became known as the ‘Vacancy Commission’. The commission was asked to delineate 
                                                     
3  Until 2006, East Germany as a whole (excluding Berlin) had EU Objective 1 status. 
4  Full translation of the official title: ‘Neighbourhoods with specific needs - the socially integrative city’. See also our Bremen City Report. 
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 viable solutions to the problem. According to their report, almost one million housing units were vacant in East 
Germany by the late 1990s (Expertenkommission, 2000). Given the demographic trends and the economic 
situation this number was expected to rise. The recommendation was to demolish between 300,000 and 
400,000 units over the next ten years. The report initiated a significant shift in thinking on urban development in 
East Germany. 
 
As a result of the Commission’s findings, the Federal Government launched a major programme, Stadtumbau 
Ost, in 2002. The aim was to help East German cities overcome their housing market crisis. While the term 
Stadtumbau translates literally into ‘urban conversion’, in practice it is associated with demolition. Thus, 
alongside new construction and renovation, demolition became the third pillar of federal urban policy in 
Germany. The programme has 2.7 billion Euros of funding shared equally between regional and federal 
supports. The funding is covering the period from 2002 to 2009, but will probably continue afterwards, albeit 
with lower funding.5 It has taken on board the commission’s recommendation to demolish approximately one 
third of the vacant housing in East Germany. 
 
Since 2001, 9,200 units have been demolished in Leipzig. Two thirds of the demolition was carried out in large 
housing estates, mostly in Grünau. The remainder was predominantly demolition of pre-1918 units in inner-city 
neighbourhoods. The cost of demolition over this period totalled 15.1 million Euros and was mostly funded 
through the Stadtumbau Ost programme.6 The municipal housing company Leipziger Wohn- und 
Baugesellschaft (LWB) alone demolished 5,700 units until 2005 (LWB, online). In 2005, the LWB owned almost 
44,000 housing units, of which about 17,000 were not yet refurbished and almost 4,000 earmarked for further 
demolition (ibid.). 
 
Urban renewal instruments 
While demolition was one major intervention, other parts of the urban renewal strategy were based on 
improving the quality of life and housing choices in inner-city neighbourhoods in order to attract people back 
into the city. We can distinguish two main elements of this strategy: 
• to bring middle-class households back into the city; and 
• to develop an integrated approach for the most deprived areas. 
 
There was little information about how other cities sought to tackle similar problems. Leipzig therefore became 
a pioneer in designing policies relevant to the specific situation of East Germany. In order to achieve the aims 
mentioned above, the City came up with a number of innovative ideas. The following box contains an overview 
of the main tools and programmes it developed. 
                                                     
5  Although with reduced funding, the programme was also extended to selected West German cities (see our Bremen City Report). 
6  Before the Stadtumbau Ost funds became available in 2002, demolition was financed through a special programme by the state of 
Saxony. 
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 Box 2: Instruments and programmes for urban renewal implemented in Leipzig 
Instrument / Programme Description Aims Impact 
Town-houses 
(Stadthäuser) 
 
 
 
(Fig. 17) 
Construction of owner-
occupied semi-detached 
townhouses in the inner-
city 
Create attractive housing 
choices in order to 
compete with suburbs 
By 2007: 100 houses; 
but: developers often 
prefer suburban 
locations with less 
regulation and possibility 
to develop larger areas 
Tenant Refurbishment 
Incentive 
Tenants receive financial 
assistance to refurbish 
their blocks 
Provide necessary 
refurbishment to semi-
derelict buildings 
Limited success: 
housing market offers 
large choice of 
inexpensive housing 
anyway 
Self-user programme 
(Selbsnutzer) 
 
 
(Fig. 18) 
City helps organising 
and advising ‘owner 
groups’ for buildings 
I. Provide housing for 
middle-classes; stop 
suburbanisation 
II. Consolidation of older 
housing stock 
2001-2007: ~ 300 
families (½ in older 
housing units, ½ in new 
town-houses, see 
above) 
’Guardian houses’ 
(Wächterhäuser) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 19) 
Temporary rental-free 
lease of decaying 
buildings in strategic 
locations, occupiers 
required to make 
necessary repairs; 
coordinated by not-for-
profit group 
Save endangered 
buildings from further 
dereliction; positive 
signal for area; side-
effect: housing option for 
creative groups (e.g. 
students, artists) 
Small symbolic impact; 
Total: 8 buildings 
Temporary use of private 
property as public spaces 
(Gestattungs-vertrag) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 20) 
Contract between city 
and land owner; city 
allowed to temporarily 
use privately owned land 
as public space, e.g. 
local park; duration of 
lease usually 10 years. 
Owner responsible for 
demolition and clearing 
of site, but freed from 
property taxes and site 
security 
Increase quality of life 
and attractiveness of 
area; creating beneficial 
intermediate solutions 
for owner and city 
Successful: 106 
contracts (1999-2005); 
funding: 6 million Euros 
(until 2006) 
Sources: interviews with representatives of departments of Urban Renewal & Housing and Urban Planning, City of Leipzig. 
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 Fig. 17: Advertisement for new ‘town-houses’ Fig. 18: Advertisement for ‘self-user programme’ 
  
 
Fig. 19: ‘Guardian house’ Fig. 20: Interim use as neighbourhood park 
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 A good example of how quality of life can be improved through environmental regeneration is the reclamation of 
former mines just outside of the city. The landscape to the south of Leipzig is scarred with the legacy of open-
cast lignite mines, the last of which closed in the late 1990s. This area is currently undergoing an impressive 
process of ‘landscape transformation’ (S. Kabisch, presentation at CRG meeting, Sept. 2006). The former 
mines are being flooded and the plan is to create a large lake district for leisure uses 
(www.leipzigerneuseenland.de). The dark areas in Figure 21 show lakes that have already been created and 
are used by the population for activities such as swimming or sailing. The lighter areas are currently being 
flooded and will be available in the near future. The large central area shows the city of Leipzig. This example 
shows the potential and importance of quality of life factors, based on a clean environment and leisure ameni-
ties, in post-industrial cities such as Leipzig. 
 
Fig. 21: The emerging ‘Lake District’ around Leipzig 
 
Source: Stadt Leipzig (2005) 
 
 
3.3 Major investments in urban regeneration 
The first phase of urban regeneration after reunification was characterised by the implementation of pro-growth 
strategies. In order to match the development levels of Western Germany and to create confidence for inves-
tors, massive transfer payments were made to East Germany. In 2003, subsidies still accounted for one third of 
the gross economic product of the new Länder. Convinced by the arguments in favour of rapid equalisation of 
standards, both regional and city governments became heavily involved in large-scale projects. 
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 During most of the 1990s, the City of Leipzig, driven by this euphoria, embraced ongoing economic restructur-
ing. A construction boom followed. The city engaged actively in overcoming its industrial past and re-emerging 
as a service and trade centre. The investment in the construction of the new trade fair complex on the outskirts 
of the city reflects the strategy of re-establishing the city as an important hub for trade and commerce (Fig. 24). 
Another plan was to establish Leipzig as a leading regional centre for banking and finance (Heinker, 2004). 
 
Over this period, large-scale investments were also made in the revitalisation of the city centre, which was 
characterised by decay and a lack of centre-city functions, and was therefore quickly losing ground to new sub-
urban retail developments. One major project was the modernisation of the main train station, including the ad-
dition of a shopping mall, the first such project in Germany (Fig. 25). By the late 1990s, the city centre had re-
gained mass and confidence, as reflected in a series of retail and, to a lesser degree, office developments. Re-
vitalisation efforts were directed at inhabitants and tourists alike, with many historic buildings being refurbished, 
including the new and old town halls, churches, merchant houses and Leipzig’s typical historic shopping ar-
cades (Fig. 22). 
 
Fig. 22: City centre: historic merchant houses and new Museum of Fine Arts 
 
 
Since the early 1990s, many other massive investments have been made to modernise the transport and utili-
ties infrastructure and networks (Fig. 23). Leipzig is now well-linked by newly-built or modernised highways. A 
new fast-train link has reduced travel time to Berlin to one hour. Another major investment in transport infra-
structure is the ‘city tunnel’ currently under construction that aims at improving suburban and regional train 
connections. In addition to investments in road and rail-based infrastructure, the Leipzig-Halle airport on the 
northern development axis just outside the city was modernised and extended. With its 24-hour flight access it 
is developing into a major hub for air cargo and logistics. 
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 Fig. 23: Major public sector investments in Leipzig and surroundings 
Location Project Sector Period Investment 
(million €) 
Technical Infrastructure 
(gas, electricity, water) 
Technical infrastructure  
 
1993-1994 1,000 
Main Train Station  
(modernisation, shopping mall) 
Transport infrastructure, 
retail 
1996-1998 260 
Fine Arts Museum Museum, arts 2000-2004 73 
City Tunnel Transport infrastructure 2003-2010 572 
City 
University Campus (modernisation) Higher education 2004-2009 150 
New Leipzig Fair Trade fairs, Commerce 1993-1995 2,060 
Leipzig Airport  
(modernisation, expansion) 
Transport infrastructure 1993-2000 660 
Leipzig-Halle Cargo Handling Centre 
(GVZ) 
Transport infrastructure, 
logistics 
1993-1994 50 
Medical Scientific Centre Health services 1992-1996 1,500 
(Re)development of enterprise areas Business / industrial park 1993-1996 1,200 
Urban 
fringe 
Various media-related projects  
(e.g. Media City, printing quarter, etc.) 
Media, publishing 1993-2003 1,150 
Sources: Stadt Leipzig (2005); Nuissl and Rink (2003) 
Note: Although mainly financed with public funding, many of these projects also received funding from the private sector. 
 
Fig. 24: New Trade Fair: reviving traditional function Fig. 25: Main train station: refurbished and now 
 equipped with a shopping mall 
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 Attracting new companies 
It soon became clear that the initial focus of economic development on a service-led recovery had not brought 
strong enough results. Recognising that subsidies and other public funding would not be available forever, the 
City shifted its economic development strategy in the late 1990s. The high unemployment levels related mostly 
to loss of industrial employment, so the almost complete absence of large private sector companies drove the 
City to a stronger emphasis on attracting major new companies and adapting to the new employment situation. 
This reorientation has been successful. Several new companies located new production or service sites in 
Leipzig. The most significant were from two specific economic sectors, car manufacturing and logistics (Figs. 
26 and 27): 
• Car manufacturing: Both BMW and Porsche decided to build new plants to produce new car models 
in Leipzig. Including suppliers, this sector has created some 6,000 new jobs in the region so far (M. 
Schimansky, interview). BMW’s plant was designed by the renowned international architect Zaha 
Hadid. 
• Logistics: The first major company that invested in Leipzig was the mail-order company Quelle. More 
recently, DHL and Amazon followed. Both decided to locate their European distribution centres in or – 
as in the case of DHL - nearby Leipzig. So far, about 5,000 predominantly low-skilled jobs have been 
created in this sector. An estimated 4,000 more will be added when the DHL centre fully starts operat-
ing in 2010 (interview notes, A. Kreideweiss). The expansion of the logistics sector may be related to 
Leipzig’s history as a trade hub. With the expansion of the EU, Leipzig is now centrally located in 
Europe’s transport networks. Still, the success is even more closely related to the heavy subsidies into 
transport infrastructure, especially the airport, which operates without flight restrictions during the night 
for freight traffic. The development of cargo handling centre near the airport with public-sector funding 
in the mid-1990s is another strategic investment in this direction. 
 
Fig. 26: North Leipzig development corridor: Highway exit for BMW plant, Quelle warehouse and new 
Trade Fair complex 
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 Fig. 27: Major private sector investments in Leipzig 
Location Company Economic sector (and 
project) 
Construction 
period 
Investment 
(million Euros) 
New jobs 
Quelle Logistics, mail-order, storage 1992-1995 500 2,500 (peak)
Porsche Car manufacturing 2000-2002/09 130 (+120) 400
BMW Car manufacturing 2002-2005 1,400 Currently: 3,500; 
planned: 5,500
DHL Logistics, mail services, 
transport 
2005-2008 300 Currently: 3,500; 
planned: 7,000
Amazon Logistics, mail-order, storage 2006-2008 90 300
Urban 
fringe 
Belantis Leisure and entertainment 
(theme park) 
2001-2008 580 40
Deutsche 
Telekom 
Communications (office 
building, technical 
equipment) 
1992-1995 580 
Karstadt Retail (department store)  ~ 100 
City 
Centre 
Different 
property 
developers 
Offices, retail (refurbishment 
of Messe tower) 
2003-2005 ~ 60 
Sources: Stadt Leipzig (2005); Nuissl and Rink (2003) 
Note: Although mainly financed by the private sector, many of these projects also received public-sector subsidies. 
 
There were several decisive factors in this success, such as the availability of brownfield land and a ready 
workforce, as well as increasingly deregulated labour laws. Almost all of these companies also benefited from 
generous public subsidies, especially for site preparations. The city’s land-supply strategy aims to ensure that 
appropriate land is available for potential investors. In a few cases, to facilitate investment, Leipzig has ex-
changed parcels of land with surrounding municipalities. The city also realised that, in order to improve its posi-
tion in the context of increased competition for investment on a regional, national and international level, it 
needed to put extra effort into attracting companies and designing special business services. One such exam-
ple is the job agency PUUL (Box 3). 
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 Box 3: Municipal job agency PUUL 
The job agency PUUL was created in 2001 by the City of Leipzig. PUUL is the German abbreviation for ‘human 
resource support for companies in Leipzig’. The city financed the first three years of its operation. The 
motivation for its creation was to provide an incentive to BMW to choose the city for its new plant. It offered 
human resource services such as pre-selecting the workforce. It also offered a relocation service for top 
managers. Being a municipal company with a social component, it was required to ensure that one third of the 
jobs were given to formerly unemployed persons, especially the long-term unemployed. Another aim was to 
avoid enticing employees form other companies. Although the primary task is to create benefits for Leipzig, 
PUUL also operates in the region. The task was enormous. Although only online applications were accepted, 
PUUL received 120,000 applications for approximately 3,000 jobs at BMW. Although the city stopped financing 
its operations in 2004, it remains the main shareholder. PUUL has secured private-sector funding from a 
number of companies, mainly suppliers of the car manufacturers and logistics companies. These new clients 
were interested in using the expertise that PUUL had gained in finding the appropriate workforce. DHL is the 
largest current client. PUUL found the first 1,500 employees who are currently being trained, 90 per cent of 
whom were formerly unemployed. It also provided amazon with its workforce, 100 per cent of whom had been 
unemployed. Call centres operating in the region have recently become new clients. 
Based on interview with T. Oertel, PUUL. 
 
The cluster approach of economic development 
The economic development policy is based on a cluster approach, which was developed by university academ-
ics and then taken on board by both the city’s economic development department and a lobby group of large 
regional companies called ‘Economic Initiative Central Germany’ (Wirtschaftsinitiative Mitteldeutschland). Five 
strategic clusters were identified: car manufacturing and suppliers; media, IT and communication technology; 
health, biotechnology and medical technology; energy and environmental technology; and a cross-cluster group 
including the trade fair, financial services and logistics. Several projects were financed to help develop the se-
lected clusters. The limitations of this cluster approach are discussed below (Ch. 4.2). 
 
Urban marketing and event-based regeneration 
The City of Leipzig made considerable efforts to promote itself and secure a higher position in the European 
urban hierarchy by supporting a series of activities and major events, mainly connected with international high 
culture and sport: 
• Leipzig tried to catapult itself onto the global map with its application to host the Olympic Games in 
2012. Although it won the German selection in 2004, it did not manage to be one of the last five 
international applicants. Nonetheless, the activities and local media coverage for this bid was a major 
boost to the city and its inhabitants. Leipzig also hosted several games for the 2005 Football 
Confederation Cup and the 2006 Football World Cup. 
• As a result of its historic role, Leipzig has a significant cultural heritage on which to draw. It is 
organising events around famous former citizens such as composer Johann Sebastian Bach and poet 
and playwright, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The church where Bach played and composed still 
houses the Bach choir (Fig. 28). 
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 • The Leipzig art scene, displayed most prominently in the ‘New Leipzig School of Painting’, has recently 
attracted significant national and international attention. The success can be attributed in part to the 
Leipzig Arts College and to the city’s low rents for large studio spaces. An old textile works complex, 
the ‘Spinnerei’, for example, was gradually taken over by artists while the city council quietly tolerated, 
even encouraged, its organic development on a fairly informal basis (Fig. 29). 
 
Fig. 28: Marketing the cultural past:      Fig. 29: ‘Spinnerei’: re-use of 
statue of composer Johann Sebastian Bach     former  spinning works by artists 
    
 
 
3.4 Social programmes 
In Leipzig, interventions with a social focus have had only limited funding by comparison with the large-scale 
projects relating to economic development and physical regeneration. Many funds that have been available 
were tied to a specific geographic area. Following the strategic plan for urban renewal and housing, which we 
outlined above, the three areas of East Leipzig, West Leipzig and Grünau were identified as particularly needy. 
A range of social projects has been implemented in these areas. East Leipzig shows the highest concentration 
of disadvantaged social groups and welfare-dependent households. Some of the initiatives to tackle specific 
problems in this area are presented in the following outline as an illustration: 
• Integration of immigrants: Although high by comparison with other East German cities, the share of 
foreigners of the whole population is significantly lower in Leipzig than in most West German cities (6.6 
per cent).7 In East Leipzig however, 15 per cent of the residents are foreigners, mostly from Iraq, 
Ukraine, Vietnam, Turkey, and re-settlers from countries of the former Soviet Union. The area sur-
rounding the main local shopping street Eisenbahnstraße is the closest Leipzig gets to an ‘ethnic 
neighbourhood’ (Fig. 30). The local neighbourhood management office runs an integration project 
(DIALOG) in this area, which receives EFRE (EU) funding. It organises get-togethers between the local 
                                                     
7 For more information about the classification of the migrant-ethnic background population see Bremen City Report. For Leipzig data 
was only available for the category foreigners, which is based on nationality only. 
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 German population and immigrant households and consults with migrant households on day-to-day 
problems and the barriers they face with bureaucratic procedures (A. Kaufmann, interview). 
• Urban Renewal: All of the urban regeneration programmes and instruments mentioned so far have a 
more or less explicitly social component. Particular projects in East Leipzig include the neighbourhood 
park Rabet which was developed after the demolition of seriously decaying buildings (Fig. 31). The 
park forms part of a green corridor running through East Leipzig (Rietzschkeband), which has less ac-
cess to green spaces and attractive public amenities than other areas of the city. The total costs are 
estimated as 48 million Euros (Stadt Leipzig, 2002). This corridor is being created in a project-by-
project fashion (A. Kaufmann, S. Gabi, interviews). Other elements include for example the ‘dark forest’ 
on sites cleared after demolition. 
• Local skills: The LOS programme (Lokales Kapital für soziale Zwecke) receives EU Social Funds to 
provide small-scale financial support for projects aimed at improving local skills and qualifications, es-
pecially among the long-term unemployed (A. Kaufmann, interview). 
• Support for small and medium enterprises: Some local businesses in the area benefit from funds 
from the federal government (KMU programme). 
 
Fig. 30: East Leipzig: a poor, diverse, inner-city Fig. 31: East Leipzig: new neighbourhood park 
neighbourhood     on land cleared from demolished housing 
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 4. WHAT HAS CHANGED: SIGNS OF RECOVERY? 
 
 
We can identify several key events or moments that were important milestones in Leipzig’s regeneration 
process. The dramatic political transformation following the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 made the crisis 
in Leipzig more extreme and sudden than in Western European industrial cities that went through a longer 
period of decline. Most experts in Leipzig seemed to agree signs of recovery, as opposed to the un-sustained 
post-reunification boom, could be identified since the late 1990s. The following sections outline the most 
significant changes. 
 
 
4.1 Population: strong decline, slight recovery 
Leipzig experienced significant population losses in the 1990s, and its lowest point was reached in 1998 with 
437,000 inhabitants. According to recent figures, the city now has 502,000 inhabitants. This substantial growth 
can be attributed to a number of factors: 
• Municipal incorporation: As an important footnote to the suggested demographic growth of Leipzig, the 
city’s policy of municipal annexation culminated in the reform of the municipal boundaries in 1999. Most 
of the recent population gains are explained by the incorporation of surrounding suburban 
municipalities (O. Weigel, interview). Due to these statistical measures, the analysis of population alone 
is not sufficient to explain recovery. 
• Change in taxation: This policy has particularly increased the number of students living in Leipzig (M. 
Bernt, interview). 
• Urban renewal: The urban renewal efforts have created attractive and inexpensive inner-city housing 
options (S. Heinig, interview). 
• A limit on suburbanisation: Suburbanisation quickly lost its drive in the Leipzig metropolitan area. On 
the one hand, this can be explained by the end of federal subsidies, bad transport connections and 
more attractive housing options within the city. On the other hand it reflects the larger demographic 
trends of negative natural growth and ongoing migration towards more dynamic regions in Western 
Germany. As can be observed from Figure 32, in contrast to most other Western European 
metropolitan areas, the Leipzig region now shows a reverse trend of population decline in the suburban 
municipalities and growth in the central city (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). 
 
Overall trends for East Germany show the stabilisation of the larger cities at the expense of smaller and 
medium-sized cities (Burdack, 2007). However, this trend shows heterogeneous patterns at the neighbourhood 
level; while some areas grow, others continue to lose population. Leipzig has successfully attracted younger 
households. The most numerous group moving to the city is aged 18 to 30 (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). This can 
partly be attributed to the rising numbers of students at the University of Leipzig, which is strengthening its 
position as a leading regional higher education institution and attracting many of the relatively large late-1980s 
generation (Fig. 33). It must be noted, however, that, considering the underlying demographic trends, even 
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 maintaining the population at the current level would be a major achievement (notes from 10th Urban Workshop 
in Leipzig 2007, taken by J. Schaber). 
 
Fig. 32: Population development in Leipzig and surrounding municipalities, in % (1995-2003) 
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Source: Stat. Landesamt Sachsen, quoted in: Stadt Leipzig (2006). 
 
Fig. 33: New university buildings 
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 4.2 Economic development: catastrophic decline, recent recovery 
Much has been done by the City of Leipzig to foster economic success and initiate a turnaround after a drastic 
loss of investment. The city has shown its willingness to ‘go the extra mile’, such as providing extra services to 
potential companies and reducing the bureaucracy entailed in decision-making processes. 
It has done this against the backdrop of dramatic decline in the 1990s. Even compared with other European 
cities, Leipzig’s process of deindustrialisation reached an unprecedented depth with incredible speed. 
Meanwhile, the early strategy of using economic restructuring as a basis for creating a centre for banking and 
finance failed and the construction boom could only briefly absorb manufacturing losses. 
 
Since the second half of the 1990s, and especially in the first half of the 2000s, the situation started to improve. 
The decision by several companies - especially from the car manufacturing (BMW, Porsche) and logistics 
sectors (DHL, Quelle, amazon) - to locate in Leipzig are finally signs of beginning economic recovery. Leipzig’s 
success in winning the bid to attract BMW against the competition of 250 other national and foreign cities is 
considered as particularly important. Although the city ‘already won the lottery once’ (M. Schimansky, 
interview), constant efforts are put into attracting another big investor. 
 
Employment in manufacturing consolidated in the mid-1990s and has increased slightly since then. 
Nevertheless, if compared to its former size, it would be exaggerated to speak of an industrial renaissance (Fig. 
34). Only 11 per cent of the workforce is now employed in manufacturing, a figure considerably below other 
German cities. Nevertheless, some of the traditional sectors such as printing/graphics and machine engineering 
have managed to modernise and survive in market niches, albeit with a significantly reduced workforce and 
under owned by companies with headquarters elsewhere. The cluster approach has only shown limited results. 
The success of the car manufacturing and logistics clusters is undeniable. These sectors have benefited also 
from major improvements to the transportation infrastructure. The media, IT and communication technology 
cluster with its 33,000 employees is also important. It reflects some positive development in the publishing and 
printing sector, but mostly depends on the regional publicly-owned broadcasting station MDR. The remaining 
clusters show relatively little development. 
 
Fig. 34: Leipzig: Number of employees in manufacturing (1996-2004) 
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Source: Stadt Leipzig (2006) 
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 4.3 Progress of urban renewal 
Interventions in the field of urban renewal were central to Leipzig’s recovery strategy. The particular problems 
associated with ‘shrinking cities’ required many cities confronted with broad decline to take specific 
approaches. Leipzig was the first East German city to recognise the problem and to develop its own urban 
strategy to adapt to its urban crisis. It therefore designed and implemented a number of special programmes 
and instruments, many of them highly innovative and later copied by other cities with similar problems. As a 
result of its early awareness, Leipzig now shows advanced signs of physical recovery. 
 
Successes in urban renewal, such as the provision of renovated inner-city housing, were key in the ‘fight 
against suburbia’. By the end of the 1990s, three quarters of the remaining pre-1918 housing had been 
refurbished. The numbers living in pre-1918 housing rose from 260,000 in 1998 to 300,000 in 2005, despite 
overall population losses and demolition (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). The total vacancy rate dropped from 20 per cent 
or 62,500 housing units in 2000 to 14 per cent or 45,000 units at the end of 2005 (Fig. 13). Gentrification is 
evident in the most desired inner-city locations (Wiest and Zischner, 2006). 
 
The implementation of urban renewal was, however, contested. In particular, demolition under the Stadtumbau 
Ost programmes attracted substantial criticism (for example, Stadtforum Leipzig, 2006). One of the drivers of 
decline in outer estates was that substantial funds were made available somewhat too late – at a time when 
urban decline, physical decay and population losses to the suburbs were already being reversed by a process 
of re-urbanisation. The urban development policy in Leipzig has also been criticised for focussing too much on 
reinstating a functioning property market and continuing with unnecessary demolition (Stadtforum, 2006). The 
property market showed signs of recovery even before the ‘demolition-machinery’ went into motion. As W. 
Günther (interview) argued, ‘Stadtumbau Ost is not a perfect programme. Demolition is destructive and not 
economical. Although for many other East German cities the programme brings benefits, the situation is 
different in Leipzig.’ Meanwhile, changes in the inner city areas to the west and east of the centre have 
delivered many improvements, although many social and physical challenges remain. 
 
Fig. 35: Grünau housing estate: refurbished blocks 
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 Although funding was concentrated in the neediest residential areas, they require further investment: 
• East Leipzig still shows the highest levels of deprivation in the city (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). It has high va-
cancy rates (~32 per cent) although some reduction is occurring as demolition continues. The area is 
characterised by high levels of welfare dependency and unemployment, low incomes, low educational 
levels, many one-parent households, all issues reflected in high levels of political frustration. It also has 
a less attractive public sphere. On the other hand, the influx of immigrants to this area may partly com-
pensate for ongoing population losses. 
• West Leipzig recovered more strongly than East Leipzig; the proximity of high-quality green spaces and 
an overflow of demand from the already-gentrified Südvorstadt have helped. 
• With increasingly available and attractive housing options in the older neighbourhoods, and with the 
introduction of Western consumption and lifestyle patterns, housing problems shifted to the housing 
estates built during the GDR regime. Although massive investments went into the renovation of the 
housing stock (Fig. 35), Grünau alone lost 37 per cent of its population in only ten years, from 76,000 in 
1996 to 48,000 in 2005 (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). The sustainability of the neighbourhood is severely 
threatened and even according to optimistic projections it may only stabilise on a much smaller than 
the original scale (M. Döhler-Behzadi, S. Gabi, interviews). 
 
A real asset of Leipzig is the high quality of life. While housing prices and rents are still low compared to West 
German cities, the city also offers abundant and attractive green spaces close to the inner city (Fig. 36) 
 
Fig. 36: Large green public spaces close to city centre 
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 4.4 Weak labour market 
Unlike our other research cities where unemployment has been declining since the height of the crisis and often 
even reached levels lower than the respective national average, unemployment continued to rise in Leipzig until 
2004 (Fig. 10). In 2004, the unemployment reached almost 25 per cent. The proportion of long-term unem-
ployed is high. Their access to jobs and income is considerably restricted and causes social exclusion. Mostly 
due to general economic growth in Germany, unemployment has decreased since then. Although the city has 
been relatively successful in attracting new companies, the effect on overall employment remained small. Being 
located in a weak region also meant that many of the new jobs were taken by job seekers from surrounding 
municipalities. The structural deficits of the labour market and subsequent unemployment will remain Leipzig’s 
most difficult to solve but also crucial social problems. 
 
The difficult labour market on the one hand and the creation of new jobs in the service and logistics sector has 
resulted in less secure, temporary and lower-paid employment and is already resulting in the emergence of a 
class of ‘working poor’. The region has seen a considerable increase in job agencies (F. Hahn, T. Oertel, inter-
views). While this increases the flexibility of the labour market, economic risks are shifted from the employer to 
the employee. 
 
 
4.5 Regional and wider metropolitan cooperation 
Leipzig has traditionally had a difficult relationship with the regional capital of Dresden, which is similar in size. 
Many interviewees had doubts about regional cooperation as proposed for the metropolitan area of the ‘Saxony 
triangle’ formed by the three major regional cities of Leipzig, Chemnitz and Dresden (M. Schimansky, F. Hahn, 
interviews). The most popular and accepted concept is the city region of Leipzig and Halle, the neighbouring 
city with a population of 270,000. However, decision-making between these two cities is complicated due to the 
fact that they belong to different regions (Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt). Nevertheless, although it is still unclear 
how the wider inter-urban or metropolitan agenda will evolve, Leipzig and Halle are already cooperating, share 
an airport and offer inward investors a common labour pool.  
 
 
4.6 Timeline 
Competitive disadvantage accumulated under the socialist regime led to the abrupt and intense crisis in the 
post-reunification years. Although Leipzig received large-scale federal funding and strongly invested in projects 
of urban boosterism, the crisis could not be stopped. After recognising the specific set of problems and the fail-
ure of previous strategies by the mid-1990s, the city council followed a more adapted approach. Economic de-
velopment, urban renewal and population development showed first signs of improvement towards the end of 
the 1990s. The following timeline (Fig. 37) shows the main events during Leipzig’s recent urban history which 
have led to decline and to recovery. 
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 Fig. 37: Timeline of important events in Leipzig since the late 1980s 
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 5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
 
In a relatively short period, Leipzig has gone through a dramatic transformation. Due to its traditional strengths 
in commerce and cultural activities, Leipzig was never classed as a typical industrial city either by its inhabi-
tants or by outsiders. It always had a more diverse economic structure. Nevertheless, in absolute terms its loss 
of manufacturing jobs was higher and more dramatic than elsewhere in East Germany. 
 
It seems to obvious now that the vision of ‘blossoming landscapes’ in East Germany promised by former chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl was far too optimistic. Heinker more accurately describes East Germany as ‘blossoming is-
lands in a sea of decline’ (2004). 
 
Leipzig not only exemplifies the struggles of East German cities hit hard by reunification, but also offers ideas of 
how to confront the ensuing problems. Among its East German neighbours, Leipzig is without doubt one of the 
few successful cities. In 2005, the Bertelsmann Foundation labelled Leipzig a ‘large East German city with 
emerging growth potential’.8 Considering its former significance, this re-growth is not surprising. Nevertheless, 
it sunk from being the fourth most important German city before the Second World War to a third-tier regional 
city in a relatively weak region.9 After almost 50 years of isolation in the Eastern Bloc, Leipzig may not regain 
its historic importance. The positive attitude in the city was mentioned by everybody directly involved in urban 
policy in Leipzig as a driver for change. However, many suggested that this optimism was not rooted in reality. 
 
The citizens of Leipzig played a leading role in bringing down the GDR regime with their peaceful ‘Monday 
demonstrations’ in the autumn of 1989 with its subsequent wide ramifications. The city’s civic tradition of 
entrepreneurialism and local pride put Leipzig in the lead in relation to the urban regeneration of East Germany, 
anticipating many wider trends. Leipzig’s leading role in adjusting to change was driven by the new city council 
in 1994. Increasing financial constraints and the major urban crisis that developed as job losses and population 
exodus accelerated generated many innovative approaches. The debate about how to deal with the city’s 
problems opened up new possibilities for creating more sustainable cities, offering a higher quality of life to 
residents. One important lesson from the Leipzig experience is that in the context of steep centre-city decline, 
suburbanisation needs to be confronted with real determination. 
 
Leadership was an important factor in Leipzig’s turnaround. From 1994, strong, directly elected mayors and 
able staff in key positions allowed policy continuity as well as the deployment of talent, skill and vision.10 
Although many of the expectations of the post-reunification period could not be met, the city started to build its 
                                                     
8  The other East German cities in this category were Berlin; the regional capitals Potsdam, Dresden and Erfurt; Jena and Rostock. 
9  The Global and World City research network (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc) counts Berlin, Munich, Hamburg and Frankfurt in the ‘first 
league’ of globally integrated and economically important metropolises. The ‘second league’ comprises cities with regional importance 
and some global connections such as the Essen/Ruhr area, Hannover, Bremen, Köln, Düsseldorf and Stuttgart. 
10  Leipzig mayors since 1990: Hinrich Lehmann-Grube (1990-1998); Wolfgang Tiefensee (1998-2005); Burkhard Jung (since 2006) – all 
from the Social-Democrat Party. 
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 self-confidence again. Decision-making on larger projects was often facilitated by what some commentators call 
the ‘Leipzig model’, based on consensual decision-making and cross-cutting political leadership. This practice 
has been criticised for its lack of democratic transparency (Heinker, 2004). However the reality was that 
consensus based negotiations with prospective investors impressed many managers with the city’s ability to 
make efficient cross-departmental and non-bureaucratic flexible decision making. The leading German 
economic journal Wirtschaftswoche put Leipzig at the top of a list of the most business-friendly cities. These 
extra efforts by the city have been mentioned repeatedly as being very helpful. However, the city has recently 
lost some momentum as important leading actors have moved on to more senior posts. Former mayor 
Tiefensee has become the federal Minister for Transport, Construction and Urban Development, and drawn 
some of Leipzig’s talent to Berlin with him. . 
 
Many of the future challenges facing the city are presented here in a brief summary: 
• Budget deficits: Leipzig needs to stabilise its budget. Being indebted makes flexible decision-making 
and long-term investment difficult. Such restricted room for financial manoeuvre has already prevented 
it from accessing external funding streams in the past (Stadt Leipzig, 2006). Like elsewhere, the overall 
economic growth reduced the deficit in 2007. Nevertheless, the city is considering selling off some 
more of its public-sector companies, for example the indebted public housing company LWB to reduce 
the financial burden.11 
• Economic Development: The city needs to build on previous decisions to attract companies. Like 
most East German cities, Leipzig has no significant company headquarters, or research and 
development facilities and only a relatively small industrial sector. It therefore also lacks a broad-based, 
highly-skilled service sector. 
• Future of Stadtumbau Ost: The regional government of Saxony, which co-finances the physical 
regeneration programme jointly with the federal government, has asked its cities and municipalities to 
develop integrated approaches for programme delivery. This has opened up intense debates in Leipzig 
on how to use the programme in the future. During the 10th Urban Workshop in 2007 dedicated to this 
topic most of the participants argued for a continuation of demolition, but in close coordination with the 
inhabitants (notes by J. Schaber). Some urban experts still favour the urban pattern of a ’perforated 
city’, offering a new, less dense urban form and quality of life based on a more heterogeneous and 
organic structure for the ‘shrinking city’ (M. Döhler-Behzadi, interview). Most, however, argue that 
demolition should be carried out from the periphery towards the centre to retain the dense structure of 
the typical European city. In the future, the Stadtumbau programme will have a stronger renovation 
component as opposed to the previously strong focus on demolition. 
• Social cohesion: The city’s efforts to foster social integration, given the problematic job-market and 
continuing high unemployment, require explicit targeting of unemployed groups, those on social 
benefits, older workers and the rising numbers of immigrants. Within weak market cities, local supports, 
such as community based social services, are essential for supporting those on low incomes. Although 
some local social programmes do provide assistance, such as in East Leipzig, more could be done. 
                                                     
11  The case of Dresden is often managed, where the city managed to become free of debts by selling its municipal housing company. 
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 • Real-estate speculation: The recovery of the property market has recently been matched by a ‘new 
real-estate hype’ due to speculative development by big investment companies. 
• Regional cooperation: Leipzig’s situation as a relatively successful city embedded in a weak region 
opens up the prospect of stronger inter-municipal cooperation. The idea of collaboration between the 
different parts of the region is gaining ground as a way of expanding the city-region’s economy and 
reducing public expenditure. 
• Higher education: The University of Leipzig is currently being modernised. Unlike other cities in the 
region, such as Dresden or Chemnitz, Leipzig lacks a Technical University to train a skilled workforce 
for up-and-coming high tech industries. Nevertheless, Leipzig’s population is relatively skilled in 
comparison with other European cities.12 
• Scarcity of land: Land suitable for developing industrial parks is increasingly scarce in Leipzig. The 
city is therefore cooperating with nearby municipalities, including the City of Halle, to bring companies 
into the region and create a joint benefit from spin-off effects. 
• Attractiveness: With its large share of public open spaces and leisure amenities, Leipzig and its 
surroundings are highly attractive to visitors, students and long-term residents as well as new investors. 
This quality of life should also play a role in reinforcing the potential for recovery. 
 
One of the objectives of the federal German government was to equalise the standard of living between West 
and East. The costs of this effort have been enormous, with low growth in the German economy during the 
1990s coupled with structural problems in the East German economy. It was feared by some that Germany 
would experience a ‘Mezzogiorno situation’ with a permanent division into a relatively wealthy West and a 
deprived and subsidised East. However the large-scale subsidies from different levels of government, 
particularly federal, were extremely helpful to the city. It did help put Leipzig on the map and on the road to 
recovery. 
                                                     
12  17% of the population have a higher education (Urban Audit, 2005). However, East German standards cannot be translated directly 
into West German degrees. In relation to educational levels, the statistics tend to have an ‘East bias’ (P. Frantz, interview). 
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